Systemic Risk and the Solvency-Liquidity Nexus of Banks

Diane Pierret

International Journal of Central Banking, 2015, vol. 11, issue 3, 193-227

Abstract: This paper highlights the empirical interaction between solvency and liquidity risks of banks that make them particularly vulnerable to an aggregate crisis. In line with the literature explaining bank runs based on the quality of the bank’s fundamentals, I find that banks lose their access to short-term funding when markets expect they will be insolvent in a crisis. This solvency-liquidity nexus is found to be strong under many robustness checks and to contain useful information for forecasting the short-term balance sheet of banks. The results suggest that capital not only acts as a loss-absorbing buffer, but it also ensures the confidence of creditors to continue to provide funding to the banks in a crisis.

JEL-codes: G01 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Systemic risk and the solvency-liquidity nexus of banks (2014)
Working Paper: Systemic risk and the solvency-liquidity nexus of banks (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2015:q:3:a:5

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