EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Leaning Against the Wind When Credit Bites Back

Karsten R. Gerdrup, Frank Hansen, Tord Krogh and Junior Maih
Additional contact information
Karsten R. Gerdrup: Norges Bank
Frank Hansen: Norges Bank
Tord Krogh: Norges Bank

International Journal of Central Banking, 2017, vol. 13, issue 3, 287-320

Abstract: This paper analyzes the cost-benefit trade-off of leaning against the wind (LAW) in monetary policy. Our starting point is a New Keynesian regime-switching model where the economy can be in a normal state or in a crisis state. The setup enables us to weigh benefits against costs for different systematic LAW policies. We find that the benefits of LAW in terms of a lower frequency of severe financial recessions exceed costs in terms of higher volatility in normal times when the severity of a crisis is endogenous (when “credit bites back”). Our qualitative results are robust to alternative specifications for the probability of a crisis. Our results hinge on the endogeneity of crisis severity. When the severity of a crisis is exogenous, we find that, if anything, it is optimal to lean with the wind.

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb17q3a8.pdf (application/pdf)
http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb17q3a8.htm (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Leaning against the wind when credit bites back (2016) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2017:q:3:a:8

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Central Banking is currently edited by Loretta J. Mester

More articles in International Journal of Central Banking from International Journal of Central Banking
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bank for International Settlements ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2017:q:3:a:8