Should the ECB Coordinate EMU Fiscal Policies?

Tatiana Kirsanova, Celsa Machado and Ana Ribeiro
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Celsa Machado: ISCAP

International Journal of Central Banking, 2018, vol. 14, issue 3, 237-280

Abstract: In a monetary union where fiscal authorities act strategically, fiscal cooperation is unlikely to emerge as an equilibrium. Even when the cooperative outcome is the best for a national fiscal authority, it is either not a Nash equilibrium or only one of several Nash equilibriums. The monetary authority may have an important coordinating role; however, the Paretopreferred equilibrium will not necessarily involve cooperation.

JEL-codes: E52 E61 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Related works:
Working Paper: Should the ECB coordinate EMU fiscal policies? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2018:q:2:a:5

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