Pitfalls of Coordination?

Sergey Slobodyan

International Journal of Central Banking, 2018, vol. 14, issue 3, 337-346

Abstract: I argue that the rather unfavorable conclusions of the three papers in the session on “Coordination and Tradeoffs” might not be as bad as they seem. In particular, I dwell on challenges facing the central bank using an interest rate that is different from the risk-free rate in its Taylor rule, and show that proper redefinition of the intercept and the slope of the rule allows avoidance of inflationary bias and preserves the stability of equilibrium.

JEL-codes: E43 E52 E58 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb18q2a7.pdf (application/pdf)
http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb18q2a7.htm (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2018:q:2:a:7

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Central Banking is currently edited by Loretta J. Mester

More articles in International Journal of Central Banking from International Journal of Central Banking
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bank for International Settlements ().