On the determinants of Central Bank independence in open economies
Marcello D'Amato (),
Barbara Pistoresi () and
International Journal of Finance & Economics, 2009, vol. 14, issue 2, 107-119
We test some positive implications of the commitment hypothesis for the design of monetary institutions in open economies, by studying the determinants of Central Bank independence on a sample of 55 countries, for the period 1980-1989. We document fairly consistent empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that strategic commitment is indeed important to understand cross-country variation in the level of Central Bank degree of dependence. We also address the related question why only highly industrialized countries have relied on such a solution to the inflationary bias of monetary policy whereas other countries have not. Data suggest that the answer is related to the presence and the size of world-wide common features in the business cycle at country level. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/ijfe.360 Link to full text; subscription required (text/html)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijf:ijfiec:v:14:y:2009:i:2:p:107-119
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://jws-edcv.wile ... PRINT_ISSN=1076-9307
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Finance & Economics is currently edited by Mark P. Taylor, Keith Cuthbertson and Michael P. Dooley
More articles in International Journal of Finance & Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().