Optimal structure of International Union budgetary revenues

Andrii Boiar1 ()
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Andrii Boiar1: Post-Doctoral Fellow at the European Integration Department of the Vadym Hetman Kyiv National Economic University (Ukraine)
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Andrii Boiar ()

Romanian Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 40, issue 1(49), 72-88

Abstract: This article proposes a new approach to the issue of political and financial sustainability (equilibrium) in an international union. The proposition is made to set members budgetary payments proportionate to their willingness to pay. It is argued that this willingness-to-pay principle ensures an optimal setup in the institutional system of an international union. Application of this methodology to the EU allowed deriving the members optimal budgetary contributions and brought up some other important insights.

Keywords: international union; budget; contribution; optimal; member state; EU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F36 F55 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ine:journl:v:40:y:2015:i:49:p:72-88

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