Do Economic Sanctions Against the Soviet Union Make Sense?

Andries Brandsma and Andrew Hughes Hallett

Interfaces, 1984, vol. 14, issue 4, 53-68

Abstract: Economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, as a response to its policies in Poland and Afghanistan, have been criticized as ineffective. Optimal sanctions can be derived as strategies which solve a dynamic mathematical game subject to uncertainty. They are analyzed here using a macroeconomic model of the Soviet economy and show that the Soviet Union is vulnerable to induced foreign exchange shortages. Current policies exploit that weakness.

Keywords: games/group decisions; foreign policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1984
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orinte:v:14:y:1984:i:4:p:53-68

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