The Impact of Changes in the Delayed-Entry Program Policy on Navy Recruiting Cost

Richard C. Morey
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Richard C. Morey: Department of Health Systems Management, School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, Tulane University, 1430 Tulane Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

Interfaces, 1991, vol. 21, issue 4, 79-91

Abstract: The delayed-entry program (DEP) enables an armed forces recruit to delay reporting to boot camp for up to a year from his signing up. We focused on the effects on recruiting costs of various DEP management policy parameters, particularly the size and mix of the pool. We applied the translog model, a “flexible” econometric frontier model employing a system of equations, to a pooled monthly, cross sectional data base from fiscal year 1984 to 1986. The results played a key role in the summer of 1987 when the navy recruiting command was arguing against deep cuts in its DEP size with the chief of navy personnel (OP-01). Additionally, our results emphasized that any future controlled recruiting experiments by DoD should adjust for differences across test cells in the DEP pool.

Keywords: military: personnel; economics: econometrics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orinte:v:21:y:1991:i:4:p:79-91

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