A Deployed Quantal Response-Based Patrol Planning System for the U.S. Coast Guard

Bo An (), Fernando Ordóñez (), Milind Tambe (), Eric Shieh (), Rong Yang (), Craig Baldwin (), Joseph DiRenzo (), Kathryn Moretti (), Ben Maule () and Garrett Meyer ()
Additional contact information
Bo An: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089
Fernando Ordóñez: Universidad de Chile, Santiago, RM, Chile; and University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089
Milind Tambe: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089
Eric Shieh: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089
Rong Yang: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089
Craig Baldwin: United States Coast Guard, New London, Connecticut 06320
Joseph DiRenzo: United States Coast Guard, Portsmouth, Virginia 23704
Kathryn Moretti: United States Coast Guard, Portsmouth, Virginia 23704
Ben Maule: United States Coast Guard, Los Angeles, California 90045
Garrett Meyer: United States Coast Guard, Seattle, Washington 98174

Interfaces, 2013, vol. 43, issue 5, 400-420

Abstract: In this paper, we describe the model, theory developed, and deployment of PROTECT, a game-theoretic system that the United States Coast Guard (USCG) uses to schedule patrols in the Port of Boston. The USCG evaluated PROTECT’s deployment in the Port of Boston as a success and is currently evaluating the system in the Port of New York, with the potential for nationwide deployment. PROTECT is premised on an attacker-defender Stackelberg game model; however, its development and implementation required both theoretical contributions and detailed evaluations. We describe the work required in the deployment, which we group into five key innovations. First, we propose a compact representation of the defender’s strategy space by exploiting equivalence and dominance, to make PROTECT efficient enough to solve real-world sized problems. Second, this system does not assume that adversaries are perfectly rational, a typical assumption in previous game-theoretic models for security. Instead, PROTECT relies on a quantal response (QR) model of the adversary’s behavior. We believe this is the first real-world deployment of a QR model. Third, we develop specialized solution algorithms that can solve this problem for real-world instances and give theoretical guarantees. Fourth, our experimental results illustrate that PROTECT’s QR model handles real-world uncertainties more robustly than a perfect-rationality model. Finally, we present (1) a comparison of human-generated and PROTECT security schedules, and (2) results of an evaluation of PROTECT from an analysis by human mock attackers.

Keywords: game theory; security; applications; Stackelberg games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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