Sample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics

William Sandholm and Mathias Staudigl ()
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Mathias Staudigl: Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2018, vol. 43, issue 4, 1348-1377

Abstract: We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences. We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizing the rate of decay of the probability that the sample path of the evolutionary process lies in a prespecified set as the population size approaches infinity. We use these results to describe excursion rates and stationary distribution asymptotics in settings where the mean dynamic admits a globally attracting state, and we compute these rates explicitly for the case of logit choice in potential games.

Keywords: sample path large deviations; evolutionary game theory; stochastic stability; Markov chains; potential games; congestion games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:43:y:2018:i:4:p:1348-1377

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