Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only

Sophie Bade ()
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Sophie Bade: Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham TW20 0EX, United Kingdom; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 53113 Bonn, Germany

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 45, issue 1, 353–368

Abstract: Fix a Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and nonbossy deterministic matching mechanism and define a random matching mechanism by assigning agents to the roles in the mechanism via a uniform lottery. Given a profile of preferences, the lottery over outcomes that arises under the random matching mechanism is identical to the lottery that arises under random serial dictatorship, where the order of dictators is uniformly distributed. This result extends the celebrated equivalence between the core from random endowments and random serial dictatorship to the grand set of all Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and nonbossy matching mechanisms.

Keywords: matching; core from random endowments; Gale’s top trading cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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