Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems

Eilon Solan () and Omri N. Solan ()
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Eilon Solan: School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997800, Israel
Omri N. Solan: School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997800, Israel

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 45, issue 2, 434-454

Abstract: We prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot ε -equilibrium for every ε >0, that is, an ε -equilibrium in an extended game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We also prove that, if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoffs in the game is not a Q -matrix in the sense of linear complementarity problems, then the game admits a uniform ε -equilibrium for every ε >0.

Keywords: stochastic games; quitting games; stopping games; sunspot equilibrium; linear complementarity problems; Q -matrices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:45:y:2020:i:2:p:434-454

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