Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games

Jérôme Renault and Bruno Ziliotto ()
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Bruno Ziliotto: Centre De Recherche en Mathématiques de la Décision, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSL Research Institute, Université Paris-Dauphine, 75016 Paris, France

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 45, issue 3, 889-895

Abstract: We study the limit of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to one, in non-zero-sum stochastic games. We first show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges. We then provide two-player examples in which the whole set of equilibrium payoffs diverges. The construction is robust to perturbations of the payoffs and to the introduction of normal-form correlation.

Keywords: stochastic games; limit equilibrium payoffs; folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:45:y:2020:i:3:p:889-895

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