Stochastic Graphon Games: I. The Static Case

René Carmona (), Daniel B. Cooney (), Christy V. Graves () and Mathieu Laurière ()
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René Carmona: Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544
Daniel B. Cooney: University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Christy V. Graves: Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544
Mathieu Laurière: Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022, vol. 47, issue 1, 750-778

Abstract: We consider static finite-player network games and their continuum analogs graphon games. Existence and uniqueness results are provided as well as convergence of the finite-player network game optimal strategy profiles to their analogs for the graphon games. We also show that equilibrium strategy profiles of a graphon game provide approximate Nash equilibria for the finite-player games. Connections with mean field games are discussed. A motivating application of Cournot competition is presented, and explicit computation of its Nash equilibrium is provided.

Keywords: Primary: 91A10; 91A13; 91A43; graphon games; mean field games; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:47:y:2022:i:1:p:750-778

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