The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

Siddharth Barman () and Federico Echenique
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Siddharth Barman: Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, India

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023, vol. 48, issue 1, 313-331

Abstract: We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably retraded) by coalitions of small size, and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.

Keywords: Primary: 91B14; secondary: 91B32; Walrasian equilibrium; core convergence; approximate Carathéodory theorem; piecewise-linear concave utilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:48:y:2023:i:1:p:313-331

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