Institutional Specialization and Survival: Theory and Evidence from the French Film Industry

Julien Jourdan ()
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Julien Jourdan: Department of Management and Organisation, Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL, 75016 Paris, France

Strategy Science, 2018, vol. 3, issue 2, 408-425

Abstract: Firms increasingly face fragmented institutional environments where stakeholders endorse different institutional logics. Although the effects of market specialization have been extensively studied, we do not know much about the firm-level implications of institutional specialization, i.e., when firms demonstrate consistent conformity to an institutional logic. In this study, I explore whether and to what extent institutional specialization affects firm survival. In contrast with arguments and evidence highlighting the potential negative survival effect of market specialization, I posit that institutional specialization is positively associated with survival. Because they may be more skilled at interacting with stakeholders, which perceive them as more appealing and understandable, institutional specialists, I argue, are more likely than other firms to form and maintain the reciprocal stakeholder relationships needed to operate and survive. I expect the survival benefit of institutional specialization to be accentuated when the contrast between logics decreases. I test and find support for these ideas using unique population data on French film producers (1994–2008).

Keywords: corporate strategy; institutional theory; industry dynamics; stakeholder theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orstsc:v:3:y:2018:i:2:p:408-425

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