Individual and Organizational Antecedents of Strategic Foresight: A Representational Approach

Felipe A. Csaszar () and Daniella Laureiro-Martínez ()
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Felipe A. Csaszar: Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
Daniella Laureiro-Martínez: Department of Management, Technology and Economics, ETH Zurich, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland

Strategy Science, 2018, vol. 3, issue 3, 513-532

Abstract: The ability to make predictions about strategic outcomes—what we term strategic foresight —is central to most theories of competitive advantage. This paper identifies individual- and organization-level antecedents of strategic foresight by analyzing an exercise taken by 358 MBA students. Among the individual antecedents, we show that two characteristics of mental representations (namely their breadth and agreement with consensus) are positively related to strategic foresight. Comparing individual to group performance reveals that groups exhibit greater strategic foresight than do individuals. Finally, from comparing the performance of real-life groups with “statistical” groups (for which decisions are computed by averaging the predictions of individuals before they become group members), we find that the superiority of group performance is due mostly to aggregating predictions, not representations.

Keywords: strategic foresight; managerial cognition; decision-making structure; aggregation; representation; upper echelons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orstsc:v:3:y:2018:i:3:p:513-532

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