Negociación Vertical y Subinversión

Salvador Valdés

Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, 1987, vol. 24, issue 72, 225-242

Abstract: This article analyzes bargaining games between two vertically related monopolists who trade an input. We study the case where the seller of the input has an alternative market for its production. It is shown that, in the Nash equilibrium of the capacity g

Date: 1987
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