EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Evasión Impositiva y Corrupción Endógenas

Osvaldo Schenone

Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, 1993, vol. 30, issue 91, 357-368

Abstract: Unlike most of the literature, this paper considers both the probability of detecting tax evasion and the probability of the tax official being corrupt (and taking a bribe instead of turning over the evader to the authorities), as endogenous variables. Th

Date: 1993
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/091schea.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:30:y:1993:i:91:p:357-368

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía is currently edited by Raimundo Soto

More articles in Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía from Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Jaime Casassus ().

 
Page updated 2017-09-29
Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:30:y:1993:i:91:p:357-368