Cincuenta Años de Ciclo Político-Económico en Chile

Paola Assael and Felipe Larraín
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Felipe Larraín: Instituto de Economía

Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, 1995, vol. 32, issue 96, 129-150

Abstract: In democracies, governments need to be elected, and this provides a powerful incentive for incumbents to use economic instruments around elections in order to influence the electorate. Political business cycle (PBC) theory predicts that governments will u

Date: 1995
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Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía is currently edited by Raimundo Soto

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