Learning and Belief-Based Trade

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, 2005, vol. 42, issue 126, 199-208

Abstract: We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash Equilibrium.

Keywords: No-Trade Theorem; Common Knowledge; Learning; Self-Confirming Equilibria; Marginal Best-Response Distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D84 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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