Subastando la Energía Eléctrica para Clientes Regulados: Equilibrio con Información Completa y Aversión al Riesgo

Francisco Caravia and Eduardo Saavedra

Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, 2007, vol. 44, issue 129, 1

Abstract: This paper studies the non-cooperative equilibrium of an electricity auction in which bidding firms are risk averse and have complete information. It assumes a centralized dispatch and stochastic hydraulic generation. We find that the auction allocates th

Keywords: Subastas; energía eléctrica; aversión al riesgo; oferta incierta; racionamiento eléctrico (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D81 L43 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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