Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Results of a Structural Econometric Approach

Sara Castellanos and Marco Oviedo

Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, 2008, vol. 45, issue 131, 3-28

Abstract: This analysis of the Mexican Treasury securities primary auctions suggests that the uniform format yields higher revenues than the discriminatory format. It applies the structural econometric model proposed by Février, Préget, and Visser (2004). This mod

Keywords: Treasury securities; share auction; Mexico (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C52 C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía is currently edited by Raimundo Soto

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