Gravity, Bilateral Agreements, and Trade Diversion in the Americas

Raymond Robertson and Antoni Estevadeordal.

Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, 2009, vol. 46, issue 133, 3-33

Abstract: Krishna (1998) shows that a bilateral agreement between two countries render a multilateral agreement less attractive if the bilateral agreement is trade diverting. This paper combines Krishna’s model with the empirical approach of Anderson and va

Keywords: Gravity models; asymmetric tariffs; trade diversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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