CONFLICT ANALYSIS TOOLS IN SITUATIONS RELATED TO NASH'S BARGAINING PROBLEM

Radim Valenčík, Benedikt Frank and Bastian Schulz

Economy & Business Journal, 2022, vol. 16, issue 1, 293-305

Abstract: The paper is based on the interpretation of the causes of differences between the assumed and empirically observed decision-making of players in the ultimate game. It follows the identification and definition of the phenomenon of positional investing, which allows to transform a property or income advantage into an improvement of the position of one of the players. An important step in describing the dilemmas arising in conditions where positional investing occurs is to define the function (in the simplified case, the line) of positional neutrality. To do this, it is necessary to extend the assumptions of Nash's bargaining problem. One of the most important applications is in the area of reforms aimed at more fully exploiting opportunities to develop, preserve and apply human capabilities according to their rate of return.

Keywords: nash bargaining problem; game theory; ultimatum game; positional investment neutrality function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isp:journl:v:16:y:2022:i:1:p:293-305

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