 POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTSRadim Valenčík and Ivan Vassilyev Economy & Business Journal, 2024, vol. 18, issue 1, 19-31 Abstract: The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of noncooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games. Keywords: economics of productive consumption; positional investing; positional investing neutrality function; game theory; nash bargaining problem (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isp:journl:v:18:y:2024:i:1:p:19-31 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Economy & Business Journal from International Scientific Publications, Bulgaria |
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