Posterior Odds Comparison of a Symmetric Low-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction within the Common-Value and the Independent-Private-Values Paradigms

Samita Sareen ()

Journal of Applied Econometrics, 1999, vol. 14, issue 6, 651-76

Abstract: I attempt to decide, using the posterior odds ratio, whether the symmetric common-value paradigm or the symmetric independent-private-values paradigm is a more probable explanation of the low-price, sealed-bid auctions conducted by the Indian Oil Corporation to purchase crude-oil from the international market. The estimation approach is structural parametric. The auctions are modelled as static non-cooperative games of incomplete information with risk neutral bidders. I conclude that the symmetric independent-private-values paradigm is more probable.

Date: 1999
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