The welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the US medical care market
Kate Ho
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2006, vol. 21, issue 7, 1039-1079
Abstract:
Managed care health insurers in the USA restrict their enrollees' choice of hospitals to within specific networks. This paper considers the implications of these restrictions. A three-step econometric model is used to predict consumer preferences over health plans conditional on the hospitals they offer. The results indicate that consumers place a positive and significant weight on their expected utility from the hospital network when choosing plans. A welfare analysis, assuming fixed prices, implies that restricting consumers' choice of hospitals leads to a loss to society of approximately $1 billion per year across the 43 US markets considered. This figure may be outweighed by the price reductions generated by the restriction. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Date: 2006
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Journal Article: The welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the US medical care market (2006) 
Working Paper: The Welfare Effects of Restricted Hospital Choice in the US Medical Care Market (2005) 
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DOI: 10.1002/jae.896
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