IMPACTS OF TAX AND FIRING COSTS ON SIZE OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Roberto Dell’Anno and Offiong Helen Solomon
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Offiong Helen Solomon: University of Salerno, Italy
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roberto Dell'Anno

Journal of Developing Areas, 2016, vol. 50, issue 4, 423-442

Abstract: Within the literature on the informal sector, there has been numerous research on the impact of labour regulation and the tax rate on productivity on the size of the informal sector (IS) and unemployment. These effects have mostly been analysed with the aid of search and matching models. However, we have observed, that the impact of labour regulation on the size of the informal sector and unemployment rate has not been estimated empirically. On the other hand, the effect of the tax rate on the size of the informal sector has been analysed with the aid of various theoretical and empirical models respectively. Our paper attempts to bridge the gap in the theoretical and empirical literature by demonstrating that a change in firing costs generates a trade off in the decision to operate in the informal sector or become unemployed. However, an increase in the tax rate on production can neutralise the impact of higher firing costs on unemployment. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model to show how a change in firing costs or tax rate affects the incentive of an agent to operate in the informal sector as well as the consequences for unemployment. The model’s parameters are calibrated with values used in the general literature to demonstrate analytically the impact of firing costs and the tax rate on the size of the informal sector and unemployment. Our results show that an increase in firing costs decreases the relative size of the IS but raises the unemployment rate. However, a rise in the tax rate increases the relative size of the informal sector but reduces the unemployment rate. Next, we apply panel data analysis to estimate the effect of firing costs and direct tax for a panel of 93 countries between 2000 and 2007. We find that our empirical results are consistent with the results from our theoretical model. Our results reveals how the kind of regulation (labour or non-labour) can have a direct impact on the mobility of factors of production between the formal and informal sector respectively. It also shows how regulatory policy can be refined to maximize the trade-off between the informal sector and unemployment.

Keywords: Firing cost; Informal sector; Tax burden; Unemployment; Labor regulation; Shadow Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jda:journl:vol.50:year:2016:issue4:pp:461-480

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