A New Explanation of Arms Races in the Third World: A Differential Game Model

Cheng-Te Lee
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Cheng-Te Lee: Department of International Trade, Chinese Culture University, Taiwan

Journal of Economics and Management, 2007, vol. 3, issue 2, 161-176

Abstract: This paper examines the stability of arms races in the Third World countries and assumes that the utility function is separable between the consumption and the weapon stocks. We find that the military expenditures and the weapon stocks will exhibit stability and overshooting takes place for the optimal control models. Moreover, we prove that the differential game model has an unstable equilibrium, a result opposite of Deger and Sen (1984).

Keywords: arms race; differential game model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jec:journl:v:3:y:2007:i:2:p:161-176

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