The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information

Jue-Shyan Wang and Hsiao-Yin Hung
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Jue-Shyan Wang: Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Hsiao-Yin Hung: Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Journal of Economics and Management, 2008, vol. 4, issue 2, 125-143

Abstract: Because the interests of the manager and the organization are not necessarily coincident, the principal-agent problem arises in the process of recruitment. The standard of employment and the motive in the manager's mind may influence the result of recruitment. The present paper analyzes a game in which the recruit may lobby the manager. We discuss the equilibrium when the manager has a prejudice against some applicant or has a consideration about his own future promotion prospects.

Keywords: lobby; sequential equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jec:journl:v:4:y:2008:i:2:p:125-143

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