Measuring the Benefits to Sniping on eBay: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Sean Gray and David Reiley ()
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Sean Gray: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, U.S.A.

Journal of Economics and Management, 2013, vol. 9, issue 2, 137-152

Abstract: Bidders on eBay frequently engage in sniping: that is, submitting a bid seconds before an auction closes. Using a field experiment, we attempt to measure the size of the benefit of sniping (if any). To do this we selected pairs of auctions that were as identical as possible (same item, same quality, same seller, similar closing time, et cetera). In one auction of each pair we submitted an early bid, and in the other we submitted the same bid exactly ten seconds before its close. Our results, from a set of 70 such pairs, indicate no benefit to sniping: we found evidence of 2.54% lower prices for the sniped auctions, but we did not find this benefit to be statistically significant. Additionally, we use our data to make a survey of the incidence of sniping and compare our findings with those of Roth and Ockenfels (2002).

Keywords: bidding; second-price auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jec:journl:v:9:y:2013:i:2:p:137-152

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