THE DIFFERENT IMPACTS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Michael Goujon And Aristide Mabali ()
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Michael Goujon And Aristide Mabali: CERDI, CNRS-University of Auvergne
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michael Goujon

Journal of Economic Development, 2016, vol. 41, issue 3, 1-20

Abstract: Rents generated by natural resources are usually thought to weaken the quality of institutions, particularly in developing countries. Our hypothesis is that this effect may differ depending on the types of natural resources characterized by their different degree of appropriability. We test this hypothesis using panel data covering 90 developing countries for the period 1970-2010. We find that total rents weaken the quality of institutions. However, while oil rents have a significant negative effect, forest and mineral rents do not, after controlling for the other relevant determinants of institutional quality, institutional persistence, neighbor effect, and endogeneity of rents.

Keywords: Resources; Rents; Political Institutions; Panel Data Models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 P48 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The different impacts of different types of natural resources on political institutions in developing countries (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jed:journl:v:41:y:2016:i:3:p:1-20

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