Democratization and Financial Reform in Taiwan: The Political Economy of Bad-Loan Creation
Sato Yukihito
The Developing Economies, 2002, vol. 40, issue 3, 226-251
Abstract:
This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan's financial institutions are interrelated with the society's democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the authoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institutions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as the side effect of democratization.
Keywords: Taiwan; Politics; Economy; Democratization; Finance; 台湾; 政治; 経済; 民主化; 金融 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://ir.ide.go.jp/?action=repository_action_com ... bute_id=22&file_no=1 (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jet:deveco:v:40:y:2002:i:3:p:226-251
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.wiley.com/bw/subs.asp?ref=0012-1533
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in The Developing Economies from Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michitaka Imamitsu ().