The Composition and Compensation of the Board of Directors as Predictors of Corporate Fraud

Joung Yeon Kim, Dianne M. Roden and Steven R. Cox

Accounting and Finance Research, 2013, vol. 2, issue 3, 142

Abstract: We test whether the composition and compensation of the board of directors are related to fraudulent corporate behavior. We use Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases from 2003 through 2010 to form a sample of 128 firms with violations and compare the characteristics of their boards to a matched sample of 128 control firms. SEC violations are less likely when the board has more women, independent members, and financial experts. Fraud is also less likely when director tenure is shorter and when the CEO is not the chair. Stock and especially stock option compensation are positively associated with SEC violations.

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.sciedupress.com/journal/index.php/afr/article/download/3111/1895 (application/pdf)
https://www.sciedupress.com/journal/index.php/afr/article/view/3111 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jfr:afr111:v:2:y:2013:i:3:p:142

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Accounting and Finance Research from Sciedu Press Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sciedu Press ().