Risk-based Performance, Nature of Property and Executive’s Steady Compensation: Evidence from Chinese Corporations

Danlu Bu and Homayoon Shalchian

Accounting and Finance Research, 2017, vol. 6, issue 1, 57

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the steadiness of executive compensation relative to the financial performance of Chinese enterprises. We dissociate the firm’s operating performance and risk-based performance (changes in firm’s fair value) and we examine separately the steadiness of executive compensation relative to each portion of a firm’s performance. Our results show that in China, executive compensation is somewhat steady relative to the firm’s performance and more particularly to the firm’s risk-based performance. Our results also suggest that executive compensation is relatively steadier in the Chinese state-owned enterprises and, more particularly, in the firms controlled by local (provincial) governments. Â

Date: 2017
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