Accounting Conservatism and Managerial Excess Perks

Han Li

Accounting and Finance Research, 2019, vol. 8, issue 2, 32

Abstract: This paper sheds light on the relationship between accounting conservatism and managerial excess perks. In general, there are two views about managerial perks, agency cost view and management incentive view. Under the assumption that considers managerial perks as agency costs, the abnormal managerial perks erode the value of firms. Accounting conservatism can significantly restrict the managerial excess perks. Due to the strict compensation regulation in China’s SOEs, the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess perks in China’s SOEs is stronger than in non-SOEs. Further, in the robustness tests, this paper finds that negative relationship is stronger in the firms of lower level accounting conservatism or higher level financial leverage.Â

Date: 2019
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