On the Evaluation of Effective Supervision of the Securities Market in China

Wenjuan Pan and Wenyi Lv

International Journal of Business Administration, 2015, vol. 6, issue 5, 44-51

Abstract: Past understanding of regulation effectiveness in securities market in China are limited on the phenomenon description, or on the effect of the penalties for non-compliance, and the existing literature commonly focus on comprehensive empirical analysis for regulation effectiveness in securities market. By the questionnaire survey toward regulators, fund companies, securities firms, listed companies, this paper carried on the overall evaluation for effectiveness of China's securities regulation as well as ¡°The Listed Company Termination of the Restricted Stock Share Transfer Instruction Opinion¡± issued by The Securities Regulatory Commission in China. The results show that all respondents to overall evaluation of the effectiveness of securities regulation and the specific evaluation of specific policy effect did not reach the level of 4 points (full score 7 points).

Keywords: regulatory effectiveness; the overall evaluation; policy evaluation; policy intentions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jfr:ijba11:v:6:y:2015:i:5:p:44-51

DOI: 10.5430/ijba.v6n5p44

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