Study on Dynamic Configuration of the Rights of Enterprise Internal Control

Wei Zhong and Shilei Zhang

International Journal of Financial Research, 2010, vol. 1, issue 1, 44-48

Abstract: Internal controls will be the tools of the managements who want to gain personal benefits when defects exist in its design and power distribution, and it doesn¡¯t accord with the fact and holds back the initiative of managements when their internal control power is taken back. Then, internal control power boundary must be proper so that it can serve for the interests of investors. This paper constructs the model of dynamic distribution of internal control power before relevant factors which affect power distribution are discussed. Based on model, the relevant rights of internal controls between the investors and the managements are tried to be re-allocated dynamically. Finally, factors which affect the efficiency and effectiveness of internal controls are analyzed and summarized.

Keywords: Internal control; Dynamic configuration of rights; Moral hazard; Adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jfr:ijfr11:v:1:y:2010:i:1:p:44-48

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