Will the Information Disclosure Quality Reduce the Executives¡¯ Excess Perks? - Evidence from China

Han Li

International Journal of Financial Research, 2016, vol. 7, issue 2, 73-83

Abstract: Perquisites (abbreviated as Perks) spent by managers, especially by top executives reflect the agency problems in essence. This paper investigates the relationship between information disclosure quality and excess perquisites. The testing samples are adapted from the ShenZhen Stock Exchange Market. It is found that the higher information disclosure quality of the firms is related to the less perquisites consumption by top executives. Moreover, it is also testified that the above relationship is statistically significant in lower business environment index province in China. Finally, internal control index is used as the instrument variable to solve for the possible endogeneity problem. The results further support that the information disclosure quality will reduce the executives¡¯ excess perks.

Keywords: information disclosure quality; executives¡¯ excess perks; top executives¡¯ compensation; state owned enterprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jfr:ijfr11:v:7:y:2016:i:2:p:73-83

DOI: 10.5430/ijfr.v7n2p73

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