Analysis on Corruption and Collusive Behaviors in Government Procurement in a Game Theory Perspective

Associate Prof. Xiaoyan Hao and Peixiao Qi

Journal of Management and Strategy, 2011, vol. 2, issue 2, 38-45

Abstract: Government Procurement is an important measure by which the government can guide economic development direction, protect and support national (or local) industry and implement macro-economic control. This paper analyzes corruption and collusive behaviors in government procurement practice in a Game Theory perspective. First, using Willenbrock¡¯s bidding model to analyze the rent-seeking behavior in government procurement. Second, using game model to analyze procurement officials¡¯ corruption and collusive behavior. Third, using game model to analyze suppliers¡¯ collusive behavior. Finally, this paper proposes some corresponding solutions in each part based on game model analysis.

Keywords: Government procurement; Corruption and collusive behaviors; Game Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jfr:jms111:v:2:y:2011:i:2:p:38-45

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