The Practice of Corporate Governance in Companies Receiving Foreign Direct Investment in Cameroon

David Ngoungo

Research in World Economy, 2012, vol. 3, issue 1, 2-19

Abstract: This paper attempts to demonstrate that if investors activism (institutional or foreign) is considered as an enabling element for monitoring when capital is dispersed, such can, on the contrary, lead to the counter-performances of corporate governance in the case of highly concentrated ownership. With the help of factorial analysis, we classify companies receiving foreign direct investments (FDI) in Cameroon. A comparison of groups obtained reveal that 60 % of the enterprises have a capital concentration of more than 50 % in the hands of foreign investors and are identified as a contractual link to divergent interests, with dormant managers and employees, presence of few external administrators and insignificant or low returns.

Keywords: Companies Receiving FDI in Cameroon; Capital Concentration; Widened Governance; Alignment of Interests; Contractual Link (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jfr:rwe111:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:2-19

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