Match Rates, Individual Development Accounts, and Saving by the Poor

Mark Schreiner

Journal of Income Distribution, 2005, vol. 13, issue 3-4, 7-7

Abstract: Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) provide poor people with matches for savings used for home purchase, post-secondary education, or microenterprise. Match rates for IDAs in the American Dream Demonstration (ADD) were typically 1:1 or 2:1 but ranged as high as 7:1. How did the match rate affect IDA savings? The analysis here controls for a number of confounding factors often ignored in similar studies of 401(k) plans. In ADD, higher match rates were generally associated on the extensive margin with a greater likelihood of saving something in IDAs and—on the intensive margin for those who saved something—a lower level of IDA savings.

Date: 2005
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