The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design

2016 - 2024

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A festschrift for Vince Crawford pp. 1-5: Alexander Teytelboym
Kenneth Arrow's Last Theorem pp. 7-11: Paul Milgrom
Bayesian Bullshit pp. 13-53: Sajan Srivastava, Tymofiy Mylovanov and Rakesh Vohra
The Existence of Equilibrium Flows pp. 55-81: Alfred Galichon, Larry Samuelson and Lucas Vernet
Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets pp. 83-104: Scott Duke Kominers
An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints pp. 105-130: Zaifu Yang and Jingsheng Yu

Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications pp. 1-55: Zhan Wang, Jinpeng Ma and Hongwei Zhang
Golden rule in cooperative commons pp. 57-74: Sjur Didrik Flam
A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem pp. 75-96: Gian Caspari
Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players pp. 97-106: Pathikrit Basu
Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening pp. 107-150: Braulio Calagua

Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications pp. 1-43: Oliver J. Board and Kim-Sau Chung
Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach pp. 45-69: Péter Csóka and P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes pp. 71-111: Dilek Sayedahmed
Characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms revisited pp. 113-129: Krzysztof R. Apt and Jan Heering
A regulatory arbitrage game: Off-balance-sheet leverage and financial fragility pp. 131-150: Dimitrios Voliotis

Object-based unawareness: Axioms pp. 1-36: Oliver J. Board and Kim-Sau Chung
Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems pp. 37-58: Youngsub Chun
A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment pp. 59-100: Tobias Reischmann, Thilo Klein and Sven Giegerich
On the degree of distortions under second-degree price discrimination pp. 101-112: Ram Orzach and Miron Stano
Dream teams and the Apollo effect pp. 113-148: Alex Gershkov and Paul Schweinzer

Implementation with ex post hidden actions pp. 1-35: Caleb Koch
On optimal taxes and subsidies: A discrete saddle-point theorem with application to job matching under constraints pp. 37-77: Koji Yokote
On a class of linear-state differential games with subgame individually rational and time consistent bargaining solutions pp. 79-97: Simon Hoof
Matching with compatibility constraints: The case of the Canadian medical residency match pp. 99-117: Muhammad Maaz and Anastasios Papanastasiou
Rights and rents in local commons pp. 119-140: Sjur Didrik Flåm

Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations pp. 1-38: Kim-Sau Chung and Jeffrey C. Ely
A New Evaluation Criterion for Allocation Mechanisms with Application to Vehicle License Allocations in China pp. 39-86: Jianxin Rong, Ning Sun and Dazhong Wang
Pareto Optimal Coalitions of Fixed Size pp. 87-108: Ágnes Cseh, Tamás Fleiner and Petra Harján
A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information pp. 109-117: Andrés Salamanca Lugo
Loss Aversion in Financial Markets pp. 119-137: Liyan Yang

The Uncovered Set and the Core: Cox's Result Revisited pp. 1-15: Anindya Bhattacharya, Victoria Brosi and Francesco Ciardiello
Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms pp. 17-50: André Schmelzer
Efficient Random Assignment with Cardinal and Ordinal Preferences pp. 51-96: James Fisher
Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences pp. 97-110: Haris Aziz
A Reexamination of the Coase Theorem pp. 111-132: Jingang Zhao

On a spontaneous decentralized market process pp. 1-37: Satoru Fujishige and Zaifu Yang
Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions pp. 39-55: Ola Andersson and Tommy Andersson
Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design pp. 57-104: André Veski, Péter Biró, Kaire Põder and Triin Lauri
On the Partnership formation problem pp. 105-140: Akiyoshi Shioura
Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models pp. 141-159: Philip R Neary and Jonathan Newton

Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions pp. 1-44: Jinpeng Ma and Qiongling Li
School choice under complete information: An experimental study pp. 45-82: Yan Chen, Yingzhi Liang and Tayfun Sönmez
On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game pp. 83-107: Papatya Duman and Walter Trockel
An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders pp. 109-149: Gerard van der Laan and Zaifu Yang
Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory pp. 151-273: Kazuo Murota