Verteidigungsausgaben und Allianzenverhalten. Die Nachfrage nach äußerer Sicherheit in der BRD / Defense Spending and Alliance Behavior. The Demand for National Security in the Federal Republic of Germany

Fritz-Aßmus Dieter and Klaus Zimmermann
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Fritz-Aßmus Dieter: Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik, D-22043 Hamburg

Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 1995, vol. 214, issue 1, 86-98

Abstract: The Economic Theory of Alliances allows an inside look into the basic idea of alliance behavior, especially into its formation, operation and cohesion. To explain the behavioral change of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the alliance, theoretically and empirically, the joint-product-model is introduced and applied. Major findings are presented concerning the impact of threat and income on defense spending. The impression is confirmed, that the policy of internal compensation collides more and more with defense spending. The adaptation of flexible response reduced Germany’s free-riding behavior and induced complementarity. The hypothesis was supported that the French spillin facilitates a change towards an alliance in the alliance.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:214:y:1995:i:1:p:86-98

DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-1995-0107

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