Mehr Wettbewerb durch strategische Allianzen ? / Increased Competition through Strategie Alliances ?

Morasch Karl
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Morasch Karl: Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Augsburg, D-86135 Augsburg

Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 1995, vol. 214, issue 3, 275-288

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of strategic alliances on product market competition. In the first stage the cooperating firms design a strategic contract. In the second stage there is Cournot competition between all firms. The optimal contract balances two effects: The incentive to reduce output because external effects between partner firms are internalized, and the strategic incentive to increase output. For given market conditions the relative strength of these effects depends on the number of cooperating firms. In a linear Cournot oligopoly outputs is increased if the alliance comprises less than half of the industry.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:214:y:1995:i:3:p:275-288

DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-1995-0303

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