Zentralbankglaubwürdigkeit und Insider-Macht: Empirische Evidenz / Central Bank Credibility and Insider Power: Empirical Evidence

Grüner Hans Peter
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Grüner Hans Peter: Universität Konstanz, SFB 178, Postfach 55 60 D 138, D-78434 Konstanz

Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 1995, vol. 214, issue 4, 385-400

Abstract: The empirical literature on insider power in wage determination and central bank credibility largely neglects the strategical interaction of central banks and trade unions. The paper provides a critical survey of this literature using a unifying model which considers the conflict of interests of wage-setters and monetary policy makers. The results of an estimation of central bank credibility and insider-power in Europe with Bomhoff s Kaiman Filter method are reported.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:214:y:1995:i:4:p:385-400

DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-1995-0402

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