Negative Netzwerkexternalitäten als Ursache ineffizienter Produktwahl / Negative Network Externalities as a Source of Inefficiencies in Product Choice

Rover Andreas
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Rover Andreas: TU München, Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Arcisstraße 21, D-80290 München

Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 1996, vol. 215, issue 1, 14-32

Abstract: Two rival products are supplied under perfect competition. Their negative network externalities are not allocated socially optimal under individual technology adoption. One product is adopted too often in relative terms, both in absolute terms. So there is a potential to raise efficiency of product choice by measures of public policy.Under dynamic network externalities congestion is impossible. But a product can be individually choosen even if another user could later derive greater utility from its adoption. Identification of potential welfare gains as well as derivation of appropriate policy instruments is complex while intuitive in some simple implementations.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:215:y:1996:i:1:p:14-32

DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-1996-0103

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