Dauerhafte öffentliche (Un-)Güter: Ist eine myopische Regulierung von CO2-Emissionen besser als keine? / Durable Public Bads: Is a Myopie Regulation of CO2 - Emissions Preferable to no Regulation?

Wagner Thomas
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Wagner Thomas: Hastverstr. 31, D-90408 Nürnberg

Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 1997, vol. 216, issue 1, 92-113

Abstract: Samuelson’s rule, Σ MR = MRT, refers to the provision of an nondurable public consumption good. What is the necessary condition for the optimal stock of a public durable? A special case is investigated and Samuelson’s rule is modified within an OLG-model. The properties of the bad resemble those of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases: the bad is an accumulative negative externality with delayed reaction time. Equilibrium conditions for a laissez-faire economy and a regulated economy are stated, where the regulator uses a system of emission permits. A myopic regulation which serves the young generations may cause steady states which are Pareto-inferior to those of the laissez-faire system. Crucial for this result is the atmospheric residence time of the public bad.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:216:y:1997:i:1:p:92-113

DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-1997-0106

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