Allokation der Verteidigungsausgaben in der NATO / Allocation of Defence Expenditures in NATO

Maneval Helmut, Park Byeungkwan and Kaindl Stefan
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Maneval Helmut: Universität der Bundeswehr München, Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Organisationswissenschaften, Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Makroökonomie und Wirtschaftspolitik, D-85577 Neubiberg.
Park Byeungkwan: Universität der Bundeswehr München, Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Organisationswissenschaften, Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Makroökonomie und Wirtschaftspolitik, D-85577 Neubiberg.
Kaindl Stefan: Universität der Bundeswehr München, Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Organisationswissenschaften, Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Makroökonomie und Wirtschaftspolitik, D-85577 Neubiberg.

Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 1998, vol. 217, issue 6, 681-700

Abstract: Theoretically the paper is based on the framework of models of the economic theory of alliances. The behaviour of the members of an alliance with regard to defence spending is analyzed. On the one hand national security is assumed to be a pure public good (Olson and Zeckhauser), on the other hand a joint product good (Sandler and Murdoch). Furthermore it is differentiated between hypotheses for allocation processes of the Cournot-Nash type and Lindahl type respectively. The empirical part of the paper includes 10 members of NATO (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, USA). The demand for national security (defence expenditures) is estimated for different periods: 1) 1960-1992 without threat variable (military spending of the Soviet Union), 2) 1960-1973 and 1974-1987 (with threat variable) to see whether the behaviour of members has changed in response to the strategy change of NATO from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response. A comparison by means of the j-test displays that the Cournot-Nash as well as the Lindahl hypotheses contribute relatively little to identify the actual decision within NATO members.

Keywords: External security; public good; alliance theory; burden sharing; NATO.; Äußere Sicherheit; Kollektivgut; Allianztheorie; Lastenteilung; NATO.; External security; public good; alliance theory; burden sharing; NATO. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:217:y:1998:i:6:p:681-700

DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-1998-0603

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